2 Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences and Cures, 42 Duke L.J. 1, 3 (1992) . Professor Schuck also includes third and fourth "complexity" concepts: technicality and indeterminacy. But he notes that indeterminacy may equally well be seen as a consequence of, as opposed to an element of, complexity. Id. at 4 ("Indetermi--nacy's relation to legal complexity is itself complex . . . . Indeterminacy, then, may be a consequence, as well as a defining feature, of complexity."). As I attempt to illustrate below, the notions of technicality and indeterminacy appear to more readily map on to notions distinct from complexity, and I differ slightly from Schuck and use it in this sense. Also, I do not suggest this take on complexity is the unequivocal definition. Oth--ers have defined procedural simplicity in terms of aesthetic attraction. See Janice Toran, 'Tis a Gift to be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 352, 356 (1990) .
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Clear Rules 15 predictability ex ante-not necessarily equated with density, tech--nicality, and differentiation. 3 Similarly, accessibility presents yet a third, though related, notion. Accessible regimes are those that are not technical, in Schuck's sense of the term, meaning they do not rely upon rules or standards that require expertise and specialized sophistication to deploy. By accessibility I mean the ease with which the substance of a rule is understandable by nonexperts. Dodson, following Schuck, holds that indeterminacy and technicality may be understood as elements of complexity. I find, however, that predictability and accessibility are often enough at odds with density and differentiation to support their inclusion as ideas distinct from complexity.
A legal rule, then, might be simple and accessible yet unclear, or complex and inaccessible yet clear and so on. For example, pendent subject matter jurisdiction is not overly complex, but it lacks clarity and accessibility. Federal courts may hear state--law claims in sup--plemental jurisdiction if the state--law "claims . . . are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 4 While this statute employs some technical terminology-"related to"-it is not dense nor does it establish an institutionally differentiated decision making scheme. While this rule may not be easily accessible to a layperson, it should not be seen as overly complex. The statute's relative simplicity, however, is coupled with a lack of clarity given that district courts are granted the discretion to decline jurisdiction under the supplemental juris--diction statute, leading to unpredictability of application. 5 Similarly, a legal scheme might be simple and accessible yet not clear. For ex--ample, the rules for consolidation or separation of trials are simple
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Virginia Law Review In Brief [Vol. 97:13 and (at least in my opinion) accessible to nonexperts. 6 Yet these rules lack clarity in many cases because the decision to grant sepa--rate trials is discretionary. 7 Or a legal regime can be complex and in--accessible yet clarity--enhancing for experts. For example, the rules for the perfection of interests under revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) are complex. (UCC Article 9 is a dense and institutionally differentiated code, if there ever was one). Article 9 is likely inaccessible to the lay public. Yet revised Article 9, at least among specialists, is a clarity--enhancing regime (in other words, it increases the predictability of outcomes). 8 The lesson, then, is that clarity does not necessarily coincide with simplicity or accessibility.
As such, marking a regime as complex or inaccessible does not nec--essarily mark the regime as unclear.
II. FOCUS ON CLARITY AND RULE CREATION
Dodson contends that crafting a rule of jurisdiction that is simple, accessible, and clear is a utopian project. Jurisdictional rules, he re--minds us, must balance competing policy preferences. Yet they are crafted by institutions lacking expertise. Further, simplicity and clarity require, in Dodson's view, a jurisdictional rule to speak to multiple audiences, albeit often with a rule that is arbitrarily chosen. This is a bleak picture for advocates of clear, simple, and accessible jurisdictional rules. Dodson's antagonists, however, are most often advocates for clarity full stop-not necessarily simplicity or accessi--bility. 9 As such, striving for clarity alone may well ease the rule cre--6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. 7 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bahrani v. ConAgra, Inc., 624 F.3d 1275 , 1283 (10th Cir. 2010 . 8 See, e.g., Lawrence R. Ahern, III, "Workouts" Under Revised Article 9: A Review of Changes and Proposal for Study, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 115, 121 (2001) ("While former Article 9 applied generally to transactions that were intended to secure the re--payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, with only a few exceptions, the re--vised legislation pulls in a broader range of special types of 'security interests,' which will help create clarity for specialists."). [to] . . . spend years litigating claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were wasted in a court that lacked jurisdiction"); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 821 n.1 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating a view held ating task of these jurisdictional reformers. If one could craft a com--plex and less accessible jurisdictional regime that, like revised UCC Article 9, enhanced clarity at least among specialists, I suspect that Dodson's foils would be-if not pleased-less woeful.
This raises the question of whether a complex, yet clarity--enhancing--for--specialists, regime for jurisdiction can be crafted. I am on record arguing that, at least in the 28 U.S.C. § 1331 context, a more complex, three--part regime would increase clarity of out--comes-at least in the eyes of courts and attorneys. 10 In this regard, the fact that original jurisdictional statutes in the district courts mask a "welter" of competing policies, as Dodson and the Court 11 have noted, does not render the quest for clarity entirely quixotic. In short, increased clarity is not necessarily at odds with increased complexity or less accessibility. A more complex jurisdictional rule, even if less accessible to the general public, might well lead to clari--ty-or at least I have so argued.
Focusing on clarity instead of accessibility and simplicity also re--solves the tension that arises from Dodson's supposition that clarity requires jurisdictional rules to be accessible to the laity yet remain coherent within our larger jurisprudence. To be sure, there are times when a rule should be both clear and accessible by the popu--lace at large. In criminal law, for example, where ignorance of the by many that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 doctrine as it now stands is "infinitely malleable"); Barry 1, 8 (1983) (stating that the vesting of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction "masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper man--agement of the federal judicial system") (footnote omitted).
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[Vol. 97:13 law is not a defense, 12 legal rules must not only produce predictable outcomes, but they must be accessible enough to provide the citi--zenry with notice of the prohibited conduct. 13 But not every legal rule requires this same scope of accessibility. The fairness norms (for example, foreknowledge that punishment will follow certain conduct) and the consequentialist norms (for example, general de--terrence), which support the mandate that criminal law be both predictable and accessible by the public at large, do not adhere to questions of federal jurisdiction over civil suits with the same strength. Without going too far afield defending the notion, it does not appear unfair-at least not to the same degree as is the case in the criminal law context-that a party might end up in a federal, as opposed to a state, court without foreknowledge. And it seems du--bious to believe that, in most contexts anyway, foreknowledge that a civil suit will be heard in a federal, as opposed to a state, court will deter civil wrongs. Of simplicity, accessibility, and clarity, then, clari--ty may well be all that is normatively valuable in the context of ju--risdiction over civil disputes. Furthermore, Dodson often points to complexities of interpreta--tion as strikes against the ability to craft clear jurisdictional rules. To take an example, Dodson looks to judicial interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, in particular the collateral order doctrine, 14 to demon--strate the impracticability of obtaining clear jurisdictional rules. I agree with Dodson that 28 U.S.C. § 1291, with the inclusion of the collateral order doctrine, is more complex and less accessible than the unadorned text of the statute would suggest. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that this added complexity renders the rule unclear to practitioners. 15 Indeed, the Court's recent jurisprudence has cabined 12 See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605 , 1611 (stating "the general rule that mistake or ignorance of law is no defense").
13 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding that to satisfy due pro--cess, "a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement").
14 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) . 15 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Keeps Tight Limits on Interlocutory Review, 46 Trial 52, 52-53 (March 2010) ("The Court made it clear that the collateral order doc--trine applied only in very narrow circumstances: 'To come within the "small class" of decisions excepted from the final--judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the collateral order doctrine to a finite set of circumstances, such as qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, double jeopardy, and con--tempt cases. 16 The point being that jurisdictional reform that focuses upon clarity, even at costs to simplicity and accessibility, may be more forthcoming than Dodson describes. Again, increased com--plexity does not necessarily equate to decreased clarity.
In a similar vein, Dodson often counts the difficulties of finding facts in any given case as an impediment to the creation of a clear jurisdictional regime. This is a misplaced complaint. Legal systems are designed to resolve disputes in the real world. Tough factual questions are unavoidable. Unless jurisdiction is to be based in all instances upon mere assertions in complaints, factual adjudication will be a feature of any conceivable jurisdictional scheme. Thus, this point seems to address a bit of a straw man. In any event, the adju--dication of facts needed to operate a jurisdictional scheme does not render the regime unclear-at least not as unclear as legal indeter--minacy renders such rules. Jurisdictional findings of fact are usually made at the beginning of a suit 17 and are subject to clear error re--view, drastically reducing the chance of reversal on appeal. 18 Thus, unlike legal indeterminacy, jurisdictional factual complexities are not as likely to lead to substantial sunk costs (for example, adjudi--cating a case on the merits only to find on appeal that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction). 19 Nor do factual complexities lead to the inability to predict what legal conclusions will flow from the finding of certain facts. Given this backdrop, the more charitable presentation of the clarity--based reformers' position is one that fo--cuses upon alleviating legal indeterminacy-not factual quandaries.
As clarity is the primary goal of Dodson's foils, even at the cost of adding complexity and lowering accessibility, the jurisdictional re--the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg--ment.'").
